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Introduction
India represents an example of immense complexity and diversity in cultural
production and communications. Broadcasting, film, newspaper, magazine, and
musical production have been characterised by regional and linguistic diversity,
with non-Hindi and non-English media in the private sphere especially showing
signs of remarkable growth over the last decade or more (Jeffrey 1993). While the
basic role of the state and state regulatory framework was established under British
colonial rule, it has undergone substantial modification in the post-colonial period.
In concert with many countries in the 'third world', private rather than state cultural
and media production has become increasingly dominant to the extent that it
challenges - strong central interventionist powers notwithstanding, both state
production and regulatory frameworks.
With the development of national broadcasting - television especially, through
Doordarshan, and its increasing commercialisation as a result in particular of the
success of 'soapies' such as Hum Log. and the Mahabharata and the Ramayan, the
concerted questioning of the relationship between the state and Doordarshan
gathered momentum. Pressures for the privatisation of electronic media have
grown, while many within the mass media industries have expressed concern over
the amount of control the state is able to exercise over production and editorial
content. The long standing concern with, and struggle for J:?edia autonomy based
on the BBC public service broadcasting model, has more recently and increasingly
been linked with pressures for the privatisation of Doordarshan and an overall
deregulation of the electronic media.
Indian television, which was introduced as a limited service in 1959 as part of a
UNESCO project, developed very slowly (Awasthy 1978: 208). It was given a low
priority by the Indian government as it did not fit in well with national industrial
and economic strategies and social objectives. The Indian electronics industry was in
its incipient stage of development, there was an absence of broadband
telecommunications links, and there was the concern on the part of AIR that its 'own
corps of trained personnel should produce indigenous programming ' (Awasthy
1978: 207; Bhatia et al 1984: 36). However by the early 1970s the situation had
changed considerably as a result of the expansion of local production of television
transmission and reception equipment, the setting-up of a television training
institute, and the proposed introduction of nation-wide broadband microwave
1
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linkages. After protracted debate, by 1972 the Indian government was committed to
the expansion of television services based on the co-existence of a substantial
earthbound network and a satellite system -INSAT (Singhal & Rogers 1989: 64-66).
The expansion of television services occurred against a backdrop of debate about
whether it was to be used for information, educational, or entertainment purposes,
and whether it would drain scarce resources away from sound broadcasting which,
despite its crucial role in communicating development programmes, still did not
have a complete national coverage (Awasthy 1978: 208; Singhal & Rogers 1989: 7174).
In the late 1960s, when Indira Gandhi was in charge of the Ministry of Information
and Broadcasting, expansion of television broadcasting was given much more
serious consideration by the Government (Bhatia et al1984: 37). Thought was given
to finding a way of creating an industrial infrastructure, possibly with foreign
collaboration, able to engage in the indigenous manufacture of television
broadcasting equipment. In 1971 collaborative arrangements were worked out
between state-owned Bharat Electronics Limited and Fernseh (FRG) and NEC
(Japan) for local production of studio and transmission equipment.

Colour Transmission and the Doodarshan National Network
The creation of a national television network in India is linked to the expansion of
domestic electronics industries and the easing of restrictions on the importation of
components and equipment, to the continued growth of consumer goods industries
and national advertisers anxious to exploit large, essentially petty-bourgeois
markets, and to the greater centralisation of state power.
The Congress government's drive for the development of a national television
network essentially coincided with the introduction of colour transmission. Central
to the implementation of both was the televising of three international events in
New Delhi in 1982-83. The most important of these events was the hosting and
televising of the ASIAD Games in November-December 1982. The other two events
of great importance were the hosting of the Seventh Conference of the Non-Aligned
Nations Movement and the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting. Quite
clearly the hosting of these events was seen by the Indian government as providing a
2
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showcase for India's technological and organisational ability, as well as a means for
gaining greater prestige in the international community (Pendakur 1991: 242). Rajiv
Gandhi, the Prime Minister's son, was lll-ade chairman of the ASIAD Committee,
with complete organisational responsibility for the event. While the successful
hosting and televising of ASIAD, and the other two events, was important for
international purposes, domestic considerations were not unimportant. Success
would boost Congress's image, and enhance that of Rajiv Gandhi who was being
groomed as Indira Gandhi's successor. Given the importance of television coverage
to such domestic as well as international image-building, it was essential for 'the
pomp and festivity of the games' to be seen by as many urban Indians as possible.
The introduction of colour transmission provoked a great deal of debate. Strong
advocates of its immediate introduction argued somewhat spuriously that it would
have been impossible to provide international coverage of ASIAD without it; that is,
colour transmission had to be provided for foreign broadcast organisations
(Pendakur 1991: 243). Besides, black and white television was obsolete - as the
introduction of colour television in countries such as Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and China
clearly attested- and was n~t as convincing as colour in educational programmes.
There can be little doubt that the introduction was linked to the rapidly growing
importance of television as an entertainment and advertising medium for a large and
expanding petty-bourgeoisie in particular which was increasingly attuned to the
rhythm of expanded, repetitive consumption. Critics of the introduction of colour
transmission argued that it was given much greater priority than a 'much needed
national adult education program and a community health workers' program
(which) were being scuttled' (Pendakur 1991: 243).
The introduction of television on a national scale was linked to the launching of Insat
1 (Pendakur 1991: 243). The initial daily transmission from New Delhi was to be for
one and a half hours, with the principal programme categories being information,
entertainment, and education. Clearly, as Pendakur (1991: 243) suggests, 'the
intention was to create a wider audience for the pageantry and fanfare of ASIAD
and other events in Delhi'.
The development of an extensive national television network required very high
levels of investment in infrastructural development. Predictably, after the initial
introduction of television in Delhi, new transmitters were built in major
3
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metropolitan centres such as Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Lucknow, Amritsar,
Jalandhar, and Srinagar.i As a result, between 1973 and 1983 there was an eightfold
increase in the number of television transmitters throughout India (Pendakur 1991:
244). The significant increase in signal reach enabled a much greater percentage of
the population to gain access to television.
The substantial growth of television infrastructure was made possible largely
through the sizeable funding allocations to broadcasting through successive
development plans. Under the Fourth Plan there was a significant leap in
expenditure on broadcasting. The allocation to broadcasting under the Fifth Plan
(1974-1979) established the supremacy of television when the government more than
doubled its allocation. The Sixth Plan further increased the amount to be spent on
the expansion of television (Pendakur 1991: 245).
The dramatic growth in the provision of a television infrastructure was matched by
the rapid and sustained increase in the number of television receivers in the country
(Tables 1 and 2). This was most pronounced between 1983 and 1985 when several
factors combined to dramatically increase the number of receivers.

Uppermost

among them were government measures, including the liberalisation of import
restrictions, relaxation of customs regulations, reduction of duties on imports, and a
'special provision allowing relations of citizens living abroad to send television sets
home'(Pendakur 1991: 245). During this period an estimated million television sets
were imported.
TABLE 1
Growth in the Number of Television Sets and Audiences,
1971-1985
Year
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1988
Source: Pendakur, 1991, p. 246.

TV Sets
0.004
0.16
0.45
0.67
1.1
1.7
2.8
6.8
27.00

Audience (million)
0.5

1.7
5.1
8.5

12.4
16.4
30.3
60.00
216.0 (estimated)
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TABLE2
Production of Television Sets in India (Sets in Lakhs)
1980-1990

Year

Black and
Big Size
1980
3.70
4.35
1981
1982
5.70
6.60
1983
8.25
1984
1985
13.60
13.30
1986
14.00
1987
16.00
1988
1989
41
1990
38.00
Included in big size.
*

White
Portable

1.75
4.50
8.20
17.00
28.00

*
*

Colour

0.70
0.50
2.80
6.85
9.00
12.00
13.00
11.50
10.50

Total
3.70
4.35
6.40
7.10
12.80
24.85
30.50
43.00
57.00
52.50
48.50

Source: Sivasankar & Venkateswarulu, 1993, p.70.

The remarkable growth in the number of television receivers was also the product of
a more general easing, if not abandonment, of national policies concerned with the
'fostering of indigenous research and development and production of television
technology' (Pendakur 1991: 245). Relaxation of licensing regulation governing the
manufacture of television sets allowed domestic manufacturers to import substantial
numbers of television kits for assembly in India and to take advantage of using
relatively low local labour costs.
Although there was an enormous increase in the number of television receivers, and
a much greater reach of the expanding national network, access to television was
still severely restricted to the majority of the population by the basic cost factor. The
generally low level of· wages for Indian workers has meant that for many - and
certainly unskilled factory workers and agricultural labourers, both black and white,
and colour sets, are well beyond their reach. In 1981, according to Pendakur (1991:
246) a city typist would have to have set aside all of his/her annual earnings to
purchase a relatively basic black and white television set. A colour television set
would have required the annual earnings of a school teacher or skilled factory
worker.
5

Reeves

Indian Television

The successive substantial allocations to broadcasting in general, and television in
particular, under national development plans has meant that the increasingly
extensive television infrastructure, as well as that for telecommunications, has been
largely funded through domestic savings based on the earnings of the Indian rural
and urban labouring classes. Of course, they are precisely the classes which have
least access to privatised television reception, and who are dependent to some extent
on limited access through community sets.

Television: The National Programme
The introduction of the national programme on Indian television met with more
regional opposition than support. It was essentially justified by the Indian
government and broadcasting controllers in terms of its role in the promotion of
national unity and promotion of understanding between different regions. Luthra
(1986: 430) notes that
The fare (of the National Programme) was to consist of
news in Hindi and English, and programmes reflecting
the music, dance and other aspects of life, literature and
culture of all regions.
Certainly the introduction of the national programme could be seen as part of the
attempt by the Indira Gandhi administration to establish a stronger national
presence in the regions at a time when their position was under considerable
pressure.
The regional objections to national programming, which were predictably strongest
in Tamil Nadu, included, first, the claim that it represented the imposition of Hindi
on non-Hindi states, second, the shift of the focus of production to Delhi to the
detriment of production in other parts of the country, and third, the replacement of
local prime time programming by the compulsory relay from Delhi. After
opposition the relay of Hindi news by the Madras TV Centre was dropped from
November 11 1982 (Luthra 1986: 430). It was only after discussions in Delhi in July
1983 between Publicity Officials of all the states, and Ministers of Publicity and
Information, that a revised national programme was agreed upon. The most
significant revision, effective from September rs 1983, was the shift of the National
6
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programme to the 9.00 to 10.30 p.m. time slot, thus leaving the prime time spot to
local programming.

Commercialisation of Doordarshan
The commercialisation of Doordarshan basically began in 1976 when television
services were separated from AIR and commercial spots were introduced.
Advertising sponsorship followed in 1980. The pace of commercialisation has been
encouraged, first, by the sharp increase in the number of television viewers since the
mid-'70s, and second, since the mid '80s, by the success of locally produced soap
operas- initially Hum Log, subsequently the Ramayan and the Mahabharata. As a
result of commercialisation and the success of soap operas, there has been a sharp
increase in annual revenues from advertising spots (a leap from US $0.6 million in
1976 to $130 million in 1988), increases in advertising rates, and increases in
Doordarshan's operating costs (Singhal & Rogers 1989: 79).ii (See Table 3)
Undoubtedly the drive for the increased rate of commercialisation - indeed
privatisation - of Doordarshan has come from some forces within the central
government anxious to reduce its funding commitment (while enjoying the rapid
increase in revenue from advertising and maintaining tight control over the
organisation for political purposes), from transnational corporations, their Indian
subsidiaries, and local companies interested in expanding their markets, and from
programme producers. For Bombay film producers adversely affected by the
expansion of television audiences and intense competition in the industry, there are
definite advantages in producing programmes for Doordarshan: 'there is relatively
less financial risk in producing television serials, as eager commercial sponsors are
plentiful, and problems with box office sales, film distribution, and piracy do not
exist' (Singhal & Rogers 1989: 83).

7

Reeves

Indian Television

TABLE 3
Doordarshan's Gross Revenues from Advertising, 1975-1988
(in millions of dollars)

Year
.1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1987
1988

Gross Revenues
0.65
1.73
4.14
5.13
6.73
9.39
13.25
16.50
26.19
51.92
90.66
107.33

Source:Pendakur, 1991, p.258.

Corporate Power and the Commercialisation of Television
The greatest drive for the rapid commercialisation of Indian television has
undoubtedly come from the expanding corporate and industrial sectors of the
economy. Despite uneven growth rates, throughout the late 1970s and 1980s
capitalist industrialisation accelerated. By 1979 India had become the world's tenth
largest producer of industrial commodities, and was ranked third behind the United
States and Japan in its number of engineeers and scientists. The acceleration of
capitalist industrialisation was manifested in higher national productivity, a
substantial increase in the volume and value of commodities produced, and in the
substantial growth of the number of licensed industrial enterprises. The accelerated
industrialisation was also expressed in a much greater concentration of capital
(while capital investment increased significantly, further concentration in the case of
big business occurred), the growth of exports associated with transnationals in India,
and in the development of an export orientation on the part of a number of major
private and public sector companies.
Capitalist industrialisation, and the rapid expansion of a highly differentiated
consumer goods market on a national scale, has witnessed a corresponding growth
in the financial services (this growth is reflected in the number of newspaper and
8
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magazine advertisements for banks, insurance companies, and other financial
institutions) and in advertising and market research industries. Increases in
production and demand necessitated a much greater emphasis on the creation,
identification, and management of demand through market research, advertising,
and 'appropriate' media program(ming. A concomitant of this has been the growth
over the last decade of often large-scale demographic and psycho-graphic studies of
the Indian middle class (Pendakur 1991: 251). Not unexpectedly the Indian state has
played a major part in this development with the commissioning of studies by the
health, tourism, and finance ministries. While such specifically commissioned
studies are obviously concerned with issues of policy formulation and
implementation, they ·also represent part of the process whereby the state's
informational role expands and the careful management of information and opinion
takes effect. Pendakur (1991: 251-52) goes so far as to suggest there is a fusion in the
expanded television and advertising industries of the need of the 'new regime (that
is, the Rajiv Gandhi regime) to create and manage consensus and legitimate itself in
a society that has been ripping at the edges for the last 40 years' and the need of the
industrial capitalist to generate and expand a consumer culture. Ultimately, as
Pendakur (1991: 252) notes, both the modern 'democratic' state and the owners and
controllers of industry rely on the same technologies of opinion formation and
market research to 'produce audiences/voters/ consumers'. Certainly the Rajiv
Gandhi regime, which was closely identified with the acceleration of this
development, increasingly resorted to such technologies, including the use of
television and video campaigning, to boost and shore-up its position.
The development of the modern nation-state can be read, Murdock (1993: 527)
suggests, at least in part as a 'history of attempts to manage mass participation in the
political process'. Constantly present has been a tension between 'two opposed
rhetorical figures': on the one hand, the ideal citizen who is rational, 'open to
sequential argument', and able to make considered personal choices and to soberly
register political preferences; on the other hand, there is the figure of the crowd,
which is essentially irrational, emotional, 'seduced by dramatic images, acting in
concert, bargaining by riot and demonstration'.
Since official discourse in
democratic polities has been predicated on the advancement of the responsibilities of
citizenship, it has generally denigrated the seduction of the crowd. The growth of
consumerism, however, has posed a double-pronged problem for this discourse.
First, consumerism has emphasised that consumption may provide personal
9
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solutions for public difficulties. Second, consumerism tends to negate the appeals to
the public good that underpin the rhetoric of citizenship.
In India, as elsewhere, the tensions have been manifested in the history of public
broadcasting as it has struggled to accommodate itself to the controlling imperatives
of the state and the requirements of mass democracy (where the ruling party has
attempted to control the construction and flow of political images and restrict access
to oppositional parties) in a popular field which is dominated by the increasingly
powerful forces of commercialised entertainment. Apart from trying to retain
control over the public broadcasting apparatus, while making constant concessions
and adjustments to the growth in power of private commercialised mass media and
cultural industries, the ruling party and state managers have increasingly resorted to
broadcasting and advertising as a means of shaping and controlling image and
opinion formation and distribution. When Indian politics, certainly at the central
level, were dominated by Congress the tensions were easier to contain. However,
with the decline of Congress domination, Congress fragmentation, and the
emergence of new parties or alliances of parties (Janata, Janata Dal) the tensions have
become much more difficult to contain. The decline, and substantial popular 'loss of
faith' in the dominant forms of representation, has been marked by the challenge to
them of nationalistic, anti-secularist, sectarian, and fundamentalist forces. The
response of a Congress party under electoral and ideological siege, was, beginning
with Mrs Gandhi, to attempt to accommodate and mobilise these forces to its
advantage, while trying to ensure that they did not become uncontrollable and a
powerful means of mobilisation for oppositional parties.
At the same time as the growing fragmentation and contradictions of the political
field presented major problems for public broadcasting, increasingly powerful
pressures have been directed at it by the rapidly expanding private sphere of
communications and cultural production. The accelerated privatisation of cultural
production, together with the proliferation of new communications distribution
channels (satellite and cable television networks, VCRs), have fundamentally altered
the relationship of public broadcasting to the development of consumer culture and
capitalist forms of cultural production. Increasingly public broadcasting has become
involved in a sharpening competition for 'core productive resources', creative
labour, and intellectual property rights. The competition for audience time and
allegiance has correspondingly greatly intensified.
10
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The growth and importance of the Indian advertising industry is borne out by basic
statistical data. This industry, whose growth has been predicated on a combination
of national and international capital, has also been marked by considerable
indigenisation. Although transnational agencies and their affiliates still clearly
dominate Indian advertising billings, they have been joined, if not challenged, by the
proliferation of Indian agencies.ui The growth of indigenous capital in advertising is
partly attributable to government restrictions on foreign ownership of Indian
businesses. The 1974 Foreign Exchange Review Act required all businesses to have a
majority Indian ownership. In addition, the Indian government, which has been a
major advertiser, especially in the print media, has exclusively supported indigenous
agencies.
The growth of Indian agencies, above all, has been associated with the consistent
expansion of the consumer goods sector throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. The
'liberalization' of state policies with regard to international capital has clearly
provided opportunities for the more vigorous growth of transnational agencies,
although it is also clear that the different regional concentrations of development
contribute substantially to the emergence, and continued growth of, Indian agencies.
The most prominent of these indigenous agencies has been the Ahmedabad-based
Mudra Communications Ltd which has been tied to the Reliance Corporation. In the
period from 1982 ( Rs 21 million) to 1992 (Rs 8832 million) Mudra Communications
increased their gross billings by something like forty two fold.
It is certainly clear that total billings, and the billings in the most important markets

(principally the major cities such as Bombay and Delhi), have been dominated by the
transnational agencies, with Mudra Communications occupying third place (Table
4).
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TABLE4
Top 10 Indian Advertising Agencies by Gross Income 1991-1992
Rank Name

Gross
Income
2465.27

Capitalised
Billings
16443.35

Hindustan Thompson
Associates Ltd
2205.64
14711.62
Lintas India Ltd
2
1324.00
8832.00
Mudra
Communicat3
ions Ltd
1146.09
7644.43
Ogilvy & Mather
4
964.00
6430.00
Ulka Advertising
5
705.00
4700.00
Clarion Advertis6
ing Services Ltd
617.00
4115.00
R.K.Swamy /BBDO
7
Advertising Pvt Ltd
540.00
3600.00
Rediffusion Advert8
ising Pvt Ltd
529.16
3529.50
Trikaya Grey
9
Advertising Pvt Ltd
Everest Advertising
491.00
3275.00
10
Pvt Ltd
Source: Advertising and Marketing, December 1992, p. 50.
1

Growth over
Last Year(%)
20.6
39.8
7.6
9.7
29.9
51.6
16.2
20.8
50.2
9.9

Throughout the 1970s there was a general increase in expenditure by advertisers
across the different media (Table 5). The growth was highest in the case of cinema
advertising at a time before the impact of television and video on audiences and
advertising revenue was sharply felt. Cinema's share of advertising revenue
decreased consistently throughout the 1980s, although the sharp reduction in total
advertising revenue did not occur until after 1985. From the mid-1980s television
advertising revenue increased dramatically while at the same time showing a steady
growth in overall share of advertising revenue.iv (Table 5)
The consuming public for expanding goods and services, and thus for
advertisements, was composed initially of wealthier and propertied strata essentially the new petty bourgeoisie, and certainly not the poor and the landless.
Increasingly this consuming public embrace$ higher income sections of the working
class. Television has the important advantage over most other media of being able
to effectively reach this clientele at relatively low cost, and especially through
12
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entertainment-oriented programming.
The development of the Doordarshan
national programme, and more recently satellite television, has been crucial to the
construction of national advertising and national consumer goods and services
markets.

Television, and advertising, clearly play an important role in the redefinition and
reconstruction of the 'nation' and 'national culture'.
Both emphasise the
predominance of the commodity form in society and culture, that is, they stress the
way in which the basic social relations of an Indian 'national' society are essentially
constituted by the commodity form. India is progressively redefined as a nation of
consumers. The citizen is redefined as a consumer. Aspects of Indian history,
culture, tradition, and social relations are reworked in such a way that they become
central to both the production and consumption of commodities, and a major way of
legitimating symbolically particular forms of consumption. The intemationalisation
of advertising, and especially the use of powerful international symbolic
associations, is part of the process by which Indian national culture and society is
redefined. It is important to recognise, of course, that the particular constructions of
India which are developed through popular entertainment, and through advertising,
are not necessarily shared by state policy makers, nor by the representatives of such
powerful forces in Indian civil society as Hindu fundamentalism.
The basic linkage of entertainment and advertising has been central to the drive for
more television entertainment programming. This has posed a major dilemma for
policy makers who are committed to the educational role of television while ever
mindful of the revenue advantages to be gained from exploiting popular
entertainment programming. The most substantial, and economically the most
important, segments of the television public have no need for, or any interest in,
educational and social responsibility-type programming, and feel resentful when it
interferes with their viewing practices.
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TABLE 5
Expenditure by Advertisers by Media 1975-1987
Year

Press

1975

550
(67.8)

TV

Radio

Others*

Cinema

Total

70
(8.6)

120
(14.8)

71

(8.8)

811
(100)

1976

600
(69.8)

10
(1.2)

70
(8.1)

110
(12.8)

70
(8.1)

860
(100)

1977

655
(70.1)

25
(2.7)

70
(7.5)

109
(11.7

75
(8.0)

934
(100)

1978

690
(70.1)

40
(4.1)

75
(7.6)

110
(11.2)

70
(7.1)

985
(100)

1979

1180
(77.4)

61
(4.0)

85
(5.6)

121
(7.9)

78
(5.1)

1525
(100)

1980

1460
(74.5)

90
(4.6)

120
(6.1)

160
(8.2)

130
(6.6)

1960
(100)

1981

1910
(76.7)

110
(4.4)

150
(6.0)

180
(7.2)

140
(5.6)

2490
(100)

1982

2330
(77.9)

160
(5.4)

150
(5.0)

200
(6.7)

150
(5.0)

2990
(100)

1983

2980
(79.5)

200
(5.3)

180
(4.8)

220
(5.9)

170
(4.5)

3750
(100)

1984

3210
(77.4)

280
(6.9)

190
(4.7)

250
(6.2)

190
(4.9)

4030
(100)

1985

3330
(74.3)

500
(11.2)

200
(4.5)

270
(6.0)

180
(4.0)

4480
(100)

1986

4500
(71.7)

1000
(15.9)

250
(4.0)

400
(6.4)

120
(1.9)

6270
(100)

1987

5400
(71.0)

1360
(17.9)

280
(3.7)

450
(5.9)

120
(1.6)

7610
(100)

Principally billboard and transport advertising
*
Source: Ramakrishna Rao, 1993, pp.lS-17.
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Hindu Mythology and Popular Fictions
Whereas soap operas had long been the most popular genre of television
programming in Latin American countries, in India they did not appear on national
television until1984. The first of such serials, Hum Log was a pro-development soap
opera influenced by the Mexican model. After a lack of initial popular enthusiasm
for the first episodes, and political criticism, a number of changes were made which
increased its popular appeal.
The family planning theme was diluted and themes
such as the status of women, family harmony, and
national integration became central to it (Singhal &
Rogers 1989: 95).
Hum Log's plot revolved around the joys and sorrows of a lower-middle class joint
family, with a sub-story addressing political corruption and underworld activities.
Masud (1985) notes that this setting had the advantage of securing a vast audience,
while 'domestic or domesticated space is the perfect home for scenes of intimacy and
confrontation'.
Hum Log was followed by series such as Buniyaad (Foundation) and Khandaan.
Shown in 1986-87, Buniyaad was a historical soap opera which dealt with India's
partition primarily through the examination of the life and times of a four generation
family. The saga focused on the tumultuous events following the partition with
Pakistan. Some characters in common with the earlier Hum Log were clearly
important in maintaining audience involvement and continuity. Khandaan is
the rich man's Hum Log but is meant, like the latter, for
the lower middle classes (as Dynasty, its original, is in
America). However Hum Log, despite its gaucherie, has
a certain innocence.
Khandaan is all knowingness,
contrivance and calculation (Masud 1985).
Not unexpectedly many Indian popular 'fictions' are taken up with stories from
Hindu mythology: from the puranas, and the two great epics, the Ramayan and the
Mahabharata. This applies to feature film to a limited extent (Barnouw &
Krishnaswamy 1980; Ramachandran 1985), to popular literature - especially comic
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books (especially true of Indonesia as well), and increasingly to television series
where the Ramayan and the Mahabharata have enjoyed astonishing popular success.
Ramanand Sagar's Ramayan was shown by Doordarshan in 1987-88. Based on the
religious epic, it attracted vast audiences (60 million on Sunday mornings) and
substantial advertising revenue. The televised production of the epic, which
celebrates Lord Rama's victory over the Demon King Ravana, stressed human
values such as morality, obedience, discipline, and loyalty. While for many critics
the series was a poor representation of the epic, for others it had the virtue of
stressing values which would enable people to cope in a climate of often rapid
economic and social change and moral uncertainty (Singhal & Rogers 1989: 70). The
chaupaiyans (verses) of the epic 'were put to melodious music, each conveying a
moral theme'.
The popular success of Ramayan led to the production of another Indian epic serial,
Mahabharata, which began broadcasting in late 1988. The strength and popularity
of the series is seen by some commentators as residing in its 'contemporaneous
flavour', its realism in the sense that it deals with conflicts immediately familiar to its
audience - including the 'most common cause of family disputes - property', and
above all, in the way in which 'every episode seems like a leaf taken out of the
routine happenings in any ordinary Indian family'.
Apart from the Ramayan and the Mahabharata, since the introduction of television
soap operas, there has been a great diversity of setting and themes. Vijaya Mehta's
Lifeline (Jeevan Rekha) provided a realistic portrayal of life in a hospital. Col.
Kapoor's Fauji was a semi-factual, semi-fictional account of life in the army. Ketan
Mehta's Mr. Yogi provided an initially irreverent take-off of the middle class and
modern manners. Doctor Sahib dealt with a general practitioner with a heart of
gold, while Murjim Haazir recreated turn-of-the century Bengali ambience.
Doordarshan' s programming of serials has been regarded by its critics as always
being with an eye to its political masters. One critic observed in 1989 that
Perpetually scared of incurring the wrath of the
political bosses, the DD mandarins played safe by
blocking out all that could be interpreted as
critical of the government, at the same time trying
to please the authorities by airing programmes
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that gave a boost to government objectives and
policies (D'Silva 1989).
Boond Boond was dropped after it poked fun at village panchayats and its
protagonist had some slight resemblance to the then opposition leader- later prime
minister - V.P. Singh. The Indian answer to Britain's Yes Minister, Kakkaji Kahin
was constantly butchered from the beginning. Storyline and dialogue were so
extensively altered that 'ultimately, the Bhojpari-speaking political fixer named
Kakkaji lost his identity and a promising satire was turned into a dull farce' (D'Silva
1989).
Masud (1985), writing at the beginning of the wave of Indian television soapies,
considered sponsored television in India to be 'triumph of the middle class' certainly of middle class culture. Threatened by labour disorder, urban lawlessness
and over-crowding, this class has had a 'panic stricken admiration of 'order' and
'rationality', a fascination for the consumer culture exemplified in television
advertisements which provide a type of structured order which ultimately
contributes to their subordination, and the 'celebration of celebrity' in which
politicians such as Rajiv Gandhi, and stars drawn from the film world, provide
release for their fears and aspirations. The middle classes have provided the
publicists and writers - the literati in general - who have produced the 'celebrity
culture' and the hegemony for the ruling classes of the industrialists, ex-landlords,
top politicians and senior state bureaucrats.

Hindu Fundamentalism and the Televised Epics: Ramayan and
Mahabharata
The claim has constantly been made that the growth of Hindu fundamentalism has
been fed, whether calculatingly or not, by the immense popularity achieved by the
television series versions of first, the Ramayan, and second, the Mahabharata. S.T.
Gill, the former Information and Broadcasting Secretary who initiated the serialised
television adapatations of the epics, argued that the epics symbolised essential
aspects of the 'Indian psyche' and provided a unifying symbol for the diverse
groups within Indian society (Rajagopal1993: 108).
After the success of Ramayan and the Mahabharata mythical-historical output
became a high-rating standard tare on Doordarshan (Rajagopal 1993: 109). This
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stood in sharp contrast to Indian feature film production which, while obviously
exploiting myths central to Indian culture, had largely avoided the mythological
epics. Faced with precarious financial returns from production (fewer than 15 per
cent of films recouped their initial production costs) the Bombay film industry had
not touched 'mythologicals' for many years (Rajagopal 1993: 108). As Das Gupta
(1991: 165-66) suggests, the traditional mythological film has never formed the
'favourite medium of the middle classes' and beat a retreat before the combined
pressures of demands for freedom from foreign rule and freedom from the shackles
of tradition. The overtly mythological film quietly retreated in the face of the postindependence preoccupation with modernisation, industrialisation, and the
dissemination of a scientific and 'secular' outlook. Popular film responded to the
significant shift by mythologising the present, by 'creating new models of divine
power invested in humans destined to protect traditional virtues'.
In the case of television the constraints on innovative production and the exploration
of new and different material, combined with intense competition among television
writers, meant that few took chances: the emphasis was on the production of
unobjectionable or the 'least objectionable programming' (Rajagopal 1993: 108).
Given such constraints, state initiated innovation represented the only way of
'breaking the mould'.
The adaptation of the mythological form for television, although heavily indebted to
Indian mythological film and Western representations, was nevertheless a significant
innovation, albeit one to be seen very much in the context of acute and mounting
problems facing the central state apparatus and the ruling Congress Party. Rajgopal
(1993: 109) notes that the use in series such as Ramayan and the Mahabharata of
'themes found in diverse folk traditions as well as in literature, with religious or
historical characters' offered the possibility of a bridge between 'oral and classical
traditions and between different regions'. That such programming coincided with,
and indeed, may have been part of, attempts to mobilise votes along relgious lines,
made it at least 'potentially inflammatory'.
Some analysts (Sen Gupta 1991:2558) view the development of the television epics as
part of the hegemonic project of a state under increasing fissiparous pressures whose
legitimacy is questioned, if not challenged. Sen Gupta notes that
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The intervention of the state to create a cultural
discourse. wherein fascism may find much of its
symbolic and effective power can be most clearly
seen in its hegemonic control over the electronic
media, particularly television. Despite the current
enthusiasm over 'autonomy' dissent finds no
place on television, it is perhaps naive under
present circumstances to expect that to happen.
(Sen Gupta 1991: 2558)
According to Sen Gupta, the controllers of state television, Doordarshan, basically
colluded in the violent distortion of the 'original' texts of the Ramayan and the
Mahabharata. They were prepared to set aside any evidence of a series such as the
Ramayan contributing to an environment of Hindu fundamentalist politics out of
sheer commercial considerations; after all, each episode of the Ramayan was earning
Rs40 lakhs from advertisers.
Indeed, Chatterji (1991: 209-211) questions whether the decision by the Indian
government and Doordarshan to show the Ramayan and the Mahabharata was in
breach of both the Constitution and the broadcasting codes of AIR and Doordarshan.
The Supreme Court, in responding to a writ petition objecting to certain episodes of
the Ramayan dealing with the banishment of Sita, appeared to adjudge the series a
religious broadcast (Chatterji 1991: 213-14).

The televised Ramayan and the

Mahabharata certainly exposed the fine line between religion and culture in a
country where culture is so bound up with Hinduism - and Islam for that matter
(Smith 1963: Ch.3). State or government encouragement of culture 'may amount to
the propagation of Hindu culture and Hindu religion' (Chatterji 1991: 211).
In the aftermath of the destruction of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya the Indian Union
Government and Doordarshan rejected Krishna, another expensively produced
mythological series by Ramanand Sagar who was responsible for the Ramayan.
Initially the decision to reject Krishna appeared a trifle odd given the problems
Doordarshan was suffering from a major dearth of popular serials, and damaging
competition from the satellite television channels. The rationale for the Doordarshan
decision to reject the series was provided by the Union minister Krishna Kant Sahay
who claimed that the series could have been used by the BJP to 'arouse communal
passions' (Shifa Maitra 1993: 31). According to Maitra's report, the minister 'felt that
earlier, too, the BJP had used the serial Ramayan to increase its own power and
hence the ruling party was very wary of putting Krishna on the national network'.
19

Reeves

Indian Television

In the aftermath of the Ram Janambhoomi issue and widespread violence, a series
dealing with Krishna would at least have had the potential to contribute to renewed
frenzy - especially when the the construction of Hindu temples at Kashi and
Mathura is on the BJP's and Hindu Parishad's agenda. Despite central gov1ernment
and Doordarshan rejection, Krishna has found illegal transmission outlets through
local cable operators as well as through a number of international networks. Maitra
notes that
Another gimmick adopted to popularise the serial
is the introduction of Krishna vans which tour the
Hindi belts of India showing the serial to the
masses free of cost. At the Kumbli mela at
Hardwar and Ujjain, the masses are said to have
"loved" the serial.
(Maitra 1993: 31)

The television serialisation of the Ramayan and the Mahabharata brought to the fore
the whole issue of the struggle for both the control over the means of cultural
production and control over content (Rudolph 1992). The mega-serials, according to
Rudolph (1992: 1494), first sought to interpret the epics in ways which were relevant
to contemporary Indian society. Other commentators have suggested this, pointing
to the way in which the serials, and certainly parts of the Mahabharata, could be
construed as criticising state and ruling party abuse of power and calling them to
moral account in terms of precepts which are central to the epic tradition. Initially,
some observers even suggested that Draupadi was used in the Mahabharata to
'articulate feminist sentiment' (Rudolph 1992: 1494). Second, the televised epics have
contributed to the increased standardisation of the epics, with the great diversity of
local and regional versions at risk of giving way to a national one. Third, Rudolph
notes, the televised epics have contributed to the creation of a 'national Hindu
identity', that is, to a 'form of group consciousness that has not hitherto existed'.
The serialised television productions of the epics, through their shallowness of
treatment of characters, absence of psychological introspection, praying on simple
sentiment, and striving for some contemporary relevance, do not represent such a
dramatic departure from the adaptations of language and interpretation made by
touring and local companies for village and town performances. The epics have
never represented final text 'museum pieces' but rather texts readily adaptable to
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changing circumstances (Lutgendorf 1990: Lutgendorf 1991). This is the substance of
Janaky's criticism of Sen Gupta, which, while accepting the centrality of his claim
that the televised epics have been an important part of the growth of Hindu
fundamentalist consciousness, nevertheless hinges on the status of the Mahabharata
in particular as a text. Janaky (1992) notes that the Mahabharata is a text which has
undergone a great many contradictory and dissenting constructions throughout its
life. There is as such no original text which is unambiguous in meaning and which
can be used to measure the distortion, manipulation, and falsehoods produced in the
television versions. Janaky (1992), like Lutgendorf (1990:1991), suggests that analysis
of the two epics should proceed, not on the basis of some original or authentic text
which has a fixed and unambiguous meaning, but rather on the recognition of two
texts which have been constructed, whether intentionally or not, in ways which
contribute to popular forms of Hindu fundamentalist consciousness. However there
is, as Rudolph (1992: 1494) observes, a significant difference between previous, often
localised adaptations of texts such as the Ramayan and the Mahabharata to changing
circumstances, and their adaptation, through television production and distribution,
to the 'arena of public culture where values, metaphors and preoccupations can be
standardised for national public consumption'.
Amrita Chhachi (1989: 570) uses as an example of the highly selective, careful
contemporary construction of a Hinduism that requires no 'textual or historical
verification' the way in which Sita is depicted in Sagar's televised Ramayan. Sagar,
when interviewed about his series, quite frankly admitted that in the period when
the Ramayan was set, women did not cover their torsos. However, in order for him
to convey the image of Sita as the 'pure, chaste and ideal wife' it was necessary for
her to wear a blouse - nudity would have 'violated the moral message of the serial.
Das Gupta (1991: 167) observes as an 'ironical fact' that the form of the mythological
film in Indian cinema is 'directly derived from the West' and has little if anything to
do with Indian art. The visual culture of the Ramayan, like that of all the Indian film
mythologicals, is directly indebted to the forms developed by the much villified Ravi
Varma in his late nineteenth century, heavily academic treatment of Indian gods and
goddesses." Das Gupta (1991: 169) accuses Sagar of exploiting a cheap sexuality 'Sagar is trying to extract all the commercial juice he can out of a sexy situation' -in
which there is a contradiction between the spoken language and the non-verbal.
Indeed, the non-verbal is characteristically marginalised in popular cinema and
television. Das Gupta illustrates this point by referring to the following.
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In the scene where Kaikeyi obtains her boons, she
has slinky hair falling over her shoulders, her face
made up, with heavy eyeshadow. Kaikeyi's body
language, the way she stands, the way she pouts
her lips, her coquettish arrogance before Rama, all
indicate a vulgar sexual hold on an aging
monarch which the words strenuously deny.
(Das Gupta 1991: 169)
Much of the consternation about the contribution of the Ramayan and the
Mahabharata to Hindu fundamentalism has focused on issues of sexual politics and
the representation of women. For Sen Gupta the television epics provided material
for a 'popular culture of Hindu fascism'. The epics were
faithful to the gender bias of sources of their
ideological inspiration.
This gender bias
manifested itself in two ways - one, a complete
brushing away of aspects of female or male
sexuality wherever it proves to be uncomfortable
with a masculinist, heterosexual and puritanical
world view. Secondly, the complete and total
subversion of of any dissenting voice within the
female characters, be it Gandhari's lament or
Sita' s anger or even the agony of someone as
rebellious. as Draupadi.
(Sen Gupta 1991: 2559)
Central to Indian feminist concerns has been the challenge to patriarchal forms of
authority and control which are emphasised in Hindu fundamentalist thought. This
challenge has involved, first, exposing and agitating against the more obvious and
extreme manifestations of women's subordination and oppression -dowry murders,
police rape, sati, and the abortion of female foetuses after amniocentesis (Chhachhi
1989: 573). This has been done very much in terms of the argument developed by
the early twentieth century social reform movement in condemnation of social ills·
and injustice - and thus as a way of mobilising wider public support. Second, the
challenge, as Chhachhi (1989: 573) notes, has taken the less publicised form of
establishing the connection between the more extreme manifestations of women's
oppression, such as dowry murders, and the structural violence which is
fundamental to the existing patriarchal family system.
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Patriarchal structures of authority have been under threat, not just simply from the
women's movement and women's agitation, but more fundamentally from the
demands of the capitalist labour market. The contradictions thrown up by this have
led to attempts, including violent ones, to 'reassert control and reimpose systems of
domination' (Chhachhi 1989: 573). Hindu communalism and fundamentalism, with
its strong emphasis on masculine identity, military prowess, and forms of
disciplined, para-military style organisation, is central to this. Chhachhi (1989: 575)
notes that 'almost always' the call for a return to culture and tradition, which is at
the crux of fundamentalist rhetoric, is addressed to women. Women are 'neither
acknowledged or allowed to be producers of theology, although they are the main
practitioners of religion and hence the reproducers of culture and tradition'.
Sen Gupta (1991: 2559) argues that in the Ramayan and the Mahabharata the
assertion of female identity and sexuality is either completely ignored or seen as
'dangerous' and 'castrating'. Where there is the possibility of bisexuality in
particular characters, or a real ambiguity regarding their sexual identity, it is again
either seen as a curse or completely ignored.
According to Sen Gupta (1991) the essentially rambling and encyclopedic nature of
the Mahabharata in particular, and the Ramayan to a lesser extent ('far more
cohesive in terms of structure and plot'), promoted multiple and contradictory
'readings' of the texts. The very nature of the Mahabharata was such that it allowed
spaces for both elitist and subaltern voices, for 'voices of rebellious, angry women
and voices of powerful patriarchs'. Although over time 'the elitist voice came to
predominate' the subaltern voices could not be stifled: 'theirs was a subdued but
persistent chorus that renewed itself with each reinterpretation' (Sen Gupta 1991:
2558). However, according to Sen Gupta, the televised interpretation of the epics
was such that the contradictory strain which was so much a part of the epic tradition
was negated. This construction, which may be seen as part of the very selective
construction of tradition in accordance with the requirements of a 'fascist' culture,
was part of the hegemonic control exercised over the electronic media.
The televised epics, Sen Gupta contends, contributed to the new cult of male gods
(the establishment of a holy tri:qity of Ram, Krishna, and Shivat and to the much
greater marginalisation of the mother goddess which was 'very much the stuff out of
which popular Hinduism was constructed from the late 60s onwards' (Sen Gupta
1991: 2559). The mata cult, like other popular forms of Hindu expression, was
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generally associated with the pre-Aryan, non-Brahminical 'little tradition' of
Hinduism. According to Sen Gupta (1991: 2559) 'a new Hindu identity that
deliberately highlighted its "Brahminical"/"Aryan" accents could not afford to allow
undue prominence to the mother goddess'.

Doordarshan - The Issue of Autonomy
In the late 1980s the commercialisation of Doordarshan and AIR had reached the
stage where proposals for greater autonomy were being advanced and a bill
introduced in the Lok Sabha. Many critics were somewhat sceptical of the meaning
of the proposed autonomy. Under the Rajiv Gandhi administration the electronic
media were used for party propaganda purposes (Singh 1990); the distinction
between party and government at times was a blurred one. Shortly before the end of
his administration a number of news programmes tested the limits of new found
freedom. In the Prasar Bharat bill a two-tier structure for Doordarshan was
introduced which consisted of a board of governors and a watchdog broadcasting
council. Financial control remains vested in government which retains the right to
issue directives to make or prevent any broadcast 'in the interests of security of the
state or preservation of public order' or 'on any matter of public importance'. The
government resisted pressures to go further along the privatisation route by
invoking familiar arguments about problems of development, unity and national
order, as well as the dangerous promotion of a consumer ethos which cannot be
sustained by current production levels and uneven distribution. According to Singh
(1990), however, the major obstacle to greater autonomy for the electronic media,
and privatisation, is that 'whatever the party in power, control of the electronic
media is too valuable a weapon to give away'.
The BBC model of autonomy has exerted considerable influence over Indian policymakers for several decades. As early as 1948 Nehru upheld it as the model for
Indian broadcasting, although he argued that at the time, given the peculiarities of
Indian conditions, there could be no more than a 'semi-autononmy'. Broadcasting
became a department of state. The influence of the BBC model was clearly evident
in the recommendations of the Chanda Committee (1966) and the Verghese Working
Group (1978).
The BBC model of autonomy has involved, first, freedom from governmental
control, and second, an autonomy from control by parliament (Chatterji 1991: 20324
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204). The first, despite ultimate control by government, has involved a means of
financial independence and the maintenance of objectivity in the presentation of
news, current affairs, and other programmes. The media, in other words, should not
be biased in favour of the government. The second has involved a means of
budgetary independence.
During the 1989 general elections to the Lok Sabha all parties included in their
manifestos a promise to grant autonomy to the electronic media (Chatterji 1991: 203).
The Janata Dal manifesto promised that within a year of election to office it would
establish autonomous corporations for radio and television under a parliamentary
charter.
The newly autonomous organisations would be supervised by an
independent board of governors. The BJP also pledged itself to the autonomy of
radio and television, while simultaneously raising the possibility of having separate
channels for the states (Rudolph 1992: 1491-92). However Congress I's relatively
weak commitment to media autonomy was largely couched in terms of the
'functional autonomy' Doordarshan was supposed to enjoy under the Rajiv Gandhi
administration. The Congress-I's manifesto's commitment to 'functional autonomy'
was essentially a renewal of the 'pledge that AIR and DD would be free to be
objective and fair even while remaining under the financial, personnel and,
ultimately, political, tutelage of the information and broadcasting ministry'
(Rudolph 1992:1493). When set against the backdrop of 'Rajivdarshan' and constant
intervention in the electronic media, the pledge lacked some credibility.
The National Front Government of V. P. Singh introduced a new Prasar Bharat
(Indian Broadcasting Bill) soon after being sworn in on December 2, 1989. The bill
was to be debated and passed in May 1990 after parliament reconvened in March for
its budget session. At its first reading, however, 'numerous basic changes were
introduced, thus robbing the act of being a charter of freedom for AIR and
Doordarshan (Chatterji 1991: 203).
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The Challenge of Satellite Television
Strong pressures for greater media autonomy and privatisation long preceded the
rapid introduction of private satellite television. However, it was the speed at which
satellite television was introduced, its immediate success with the most lucrative
segments of the advertising market, and its rapid encroachment upon areas of highly
successful Doordarshan programming, which intensified the crisis within
Doordarshan and exposed national communications policy as in a state of disarray.
Clearly the central Indian government, through the Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting, and Doordarshan, could effectively contain pressures for privatisation
and autonomy while the central preoccupation was with terrestrially-based
electronic media. The introduction of satellite television, through STAR TV (with its
many channels) presented a challenge which could not simply be dealt with through
the usual bureaucratic form of control and political intervention.
c'c

The initial entry of STAR TV in the satellite television market provided them with an
advantage, not just simply in terms of programming and the ability to tap the most
influential audience and advertising segments, but in the basic channels of
communication. STAR TV seized a substantial advantage over Doordarshan by
effectively tying-up the distribution system.

Today, most of the dish antennae in the country
are so installed as to receive only programmes
beamed by STAR TV. And the five parallel STAR
signals coming from Asiasat plus the two to three
inter-film channels provided by local cable-TV
operators - through whose networks satellite
television programmes are largely disseminatedtake up almost the entire capacity of the existing
distribution system.
(Chaudhury 1993: 12)
Doordarshan, relying on terrestrial transmission, was disadvantaged by its viewers
having to disconnect the cable-TV line to switch to Doordarshan. The use of Insat
for the transmission of the Metro Channel represented the first serious step on the
part of the Indian government to fight the competition from STAR TV and the other
satellite television operators.
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At the time STAR TV first began its transmission to India there was apparently little
Doordarshan management concern about the threat it posed to existing electronic
media interests. "u The sheer size of Doordarshan with its large staff (many actually
only employed on a contractual basis), 'sprawling countryside networks', diversity
of governmental contacts that could be translated into advertising revenue, and
massive popular success of series such as the Mahabharata and Tipu Sultan, seemed
to render it immune from the type of challenge represented by STAR-TV.

The

popularity of STAR-TV programmes such as The Bold and the Beautiful, Santa
Barbara, and Real Value, attracted the sponsorship of the Godrej Group.
Doordarshan and government officials, however, felt that the language factor would
provide an effective barrier against a major increase in market share. The launching
of the Hindi channel, ZEE TV, quickly removed this barrier so that the Indian
government and Doordarshan were presented with a major problem. Zee TV very
quickly attracted major advertisers: 'starting with a mere 23 advertisers in December
1992, Zee TV had attracted 85 advertisers by the end of March this year' (Chaudhary
1993: 11).
Indian government responses to the introduction of private satellite television and
private cable television systems, and the pressure for a more thoroughgoing
privatisation of Doordarshan have assumed a predictable form. The rhetoric of
response has been dominated by the concern to protect national integrity and
security from anti-national propaganda (the Pakistan factor is important here), and
to promote advertising which promotes the consumer ethos and 'elitism'.

For

example, the Inter-Departmental Committee which was set up by the government in
June 1989 to consider the policy implications, and the adequacy of existing laws
relating to the growth of cable television networks and the dish antennae system,
couched its concern very much in these terms.viu The committee, however, while
expressing concern about the impact of foreign programming, suggested that the
only effective long-term way of counteracting such influence was through the
development of better and more competitive Doordarshan programming.ix This
partly reflects the sheer difficulty of effectively controlling and licensing household
cable television networks and satellite dishes.x
Faced with the mounting competition from the satellite television channels,
declining audiences (of major importance given the impact on advertising revenue),
and increasingly shrill criticism, especially from private television and film interests,
the Doordarshan management and the Indian government responded by first,
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announcing the up-linking of the four metro channels to the Insat lA and 2A
satellites (from April 1 1993), and second, by the phased opening of three more
channels that would cater for the diverse interests and 'needs' of the country. In
addition to the national network and the metro channel, the other channels proposed
were one each for Entertainment and Cultural Activities, Sports, Current Affairs,
News, and Financial Matters. Undoubtedly the linking of the metro channels to the
satellite system, and the opening of new channels with specific market interests, will
give a considerable spur to local television production, which, prior to the
introduction of private satellite television, has been 'hamstrung' by the 'paucity of of
enough cost-effective channels of telecast' (Sinha 1993: 23).
The announced changes met with a mixed reaction from Indian film and television
interests which had been closely identified with the drive for the privatisation of
Doordarshan. Although the new channels are to cater substantially to private
television production companies, this is to be achieved without any real
relinquishment of control by Doordarshan.
The TV industry has, of course, not received the
Minister's decision very happily. If anything,
they are incensed because instead of going ahead
with their oft-repeated promise of privatisation,
the I & B Ministry has rather cunningly tried to
retain its hold over the electronic media. Despite
their assertion that commercial time would be
sold to private agencies, the ministry's decision
reflects the reluctance of the power-hungry
brokers at letting this important lever of power
and moolah go out of their hand
(Sinha 1993: 23).
Doordarshan management's decision to sell time slots on the proposed new metro
channels on a first-come-first-served basis quickly descended to the level of farce.
After putting price tags on the different slots, depending on the channel and the
time, Doordarshan set no other conditions. At least ten days before the applications
were to be received long queues of applicants (or at least their stand-ins) had begun
to form outside Doordarshan's Metro Channel offices at Tolstoy Margin New Delhi.
Some of those queueing represented major television production interests (Pronnoy
Roy's NDTV, for example) while others were completely unknown quantities. Faced
with growing chaos some applicants petitioned the Delhi High Court to have the
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queueing declared illegal. Attempting to address the chaos after an initial delay,
Doordarshan's selection criteria underwent an abrupt change from the first-comefirst-served principle to selection on the basis of computer 'random number
generation' (Suroor 1993: 9).
Pronnoy Roy's NDTV, which was orginally first in line, went to the High Court after
the abandonment of the first selection procedure. The Delhi-based North India Film
Association challenged both selection principles. On July 15 the Delhi High Court
stayed the Doordarshan selection scheme.'i In a later, detailed judgement the Delhi
High Court set aside both the 'first come first served' and 'random number
generation' schemes. While accepting six petitions challenging the validity of the
first principle of selection, the court dismissed the petition by Home Communication
Network, which had been initially successful, for its retention:u Interestingly the
Delhi High Court in its judgement upheld the contention of the government counsel
that any choice based on past performance had the tendency to create monopolies
and to inhibit new entrants. This went against the submissions of major, proven
television and film production companies, as well as against the position of the Air
Time Committee which had been set up by the Prime Minister's Office and not by
the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. The Air Time Committee, chaired by
P.S. Deodhar, had opposed the selling to early arrivals of the time slots and was
concerned that the professional background of the applicant was at the least the
starting point in the selection process: 'applicants should have proven track records
in producing television/radio programmes, feature films, video film, video
magazines, documentaries etc'. The Information and Broadcasting Ministry's
decision to ignore the recommendations of the Air Time Committee was
undoubtedly partly bound up with resentment at having their powers usurped by
the Prime Minister's Office, as well as with special arrangements which had been
worked out with new applicants.
Indian television reveals a good many of the major contradictions of state, economy,
and society. Many within the Congress- I governments' of Indira and Rajiv Gandhi
could see immense advantages in using television in particular to mobilise mass
political support through popular programming and the careful construction of
powerful images at a ·time of growing political fragmentation and Congress - I
electoral weakness. The Ramayan and the Mahabharata were produced and shown
at at time when issues of Hindu identity and communal consciousness were
increasingly important as mobilising forces, and could be seen as part of the
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response of significant sections of the Hindu upper castes to the apparent threat to
their position by middle and lower castes who rejected their status in the Hindu
varna order and in modern Indian society (Balachandran, 1993). While initially
working for Congress, the mobilisation of such forces, including the immensely
popular televised epics, ultimately, and at least in the short term, served the interests
of the aggressively Hindu BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) and Hindu fundamentalist
organisations such as the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) and the VHP
(Vishwa Hindu Parishad). At the same time the increased 'liberalisation' of the
Indian economy, with its substantial easing of restrictions on trade and investment,
and basic shifts in communications policies, exposed major contradicitions in the
state, many of whose managers wanted the benefits of sustained economic growth
and the rapid expansion of consumerism without relinquishing often direct forms of
political and bureaucratic control over programming and the construction and
dissemination of news.
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End Notes
The transmitters were built in India, partly by private companies, and
partly by state-owned enterprises.
ii

Singhal & Rogers (1989: 75-80) note that the successful commercialisation of
Doordarshan has provoked often intense debate about television's role in
Indian society, including its role in the promotion of consumerism,
competition between consumer goods manufacturers, and in exacerbating
inequalities.

iii

Each year the A & M (Advertising and Marketing) magazine provides a
detailed report on the performance of India's top advertising agencies. These
reports provide a good guide to the extent of the development of local
agencies and their principal markets.

iv

Advertising revenue for the print media, assisted greatly by the continued
expansion of the vernacular language press, continued to show steady
increase throughout the 1980s. However its share in relative terms showed a
steady, if slight, decrease.
Tapati Guha-Thakurta, in her The Making of a New 'Indian' Art: Artists,
aesthetics and nationalism in BengaL c. 1850-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992) provides a most critical account of Ravi Varma's work.

vi

This is expressed very directly in the immediate Hindutva programme of the
'liberation' of temples at Ayodhya Mathura, and Benares (Varanasi).

vii

Towards the end of 1991, STAR TV, then a little-known Hong Kong company,
acquired a satellite transponder and began beaming a 'heady mixture' of
shows to the Indian sub-continent.

viii

This is an expression of a deeper paradox. Both Doordarshan and AIR,
through increasing reliance on revenue generated through popular
programming and advertising, have contributed directly to the dominance of
the commodity form in Indian society and to the development of a consumer
culture. This has included the expansion of the market for electronic goods
(television sets, VCRs, radios, as well as software). The reservation, if not
opposition on these grounds, sits rather uneasily with, first, the trade and
investment liberalisation policies of the late 1980s, and second, with the extent
of the development of the consumer goods industries and the massive growth
of consumerism.
'Panel against ban on cable television networks',
The Hindu (International Edition), 2 March 1993, p. 7.
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The widespread introduction of cable television networks posed some
difficulty for the Inter-Departmental Committee. During the early 1990s the
household penetration of cable television increased consistently in New Delhi,
Bombay- where it was introduced much earlier, Madras, and more slowly in
Calcutta. One 1991 estimate put the number of people hooked into the cable
television networks at 50 lakhs (5 million) ('Carry on Cable', The Times of
India, 31 October 1991).
The rapid expansion of cable television networks has been at times vigorously
opposed by film producers and production personnel, by film distributors
and exhibitors, and by video shop proprietors. This occurred in Madras in
February 1991 when a range of protests and legal actions were engaged in by
different sections of the Tamil Nadu film industry.
Film industry
representatives argued that the industry was a major employer, generated
very substantial revenue for both the central and state governments through
entertainment tax, and was thus deserving of greater state support and
protection. The use of videos through private household cable television
networks breached copyright, evaded entertainment tax, and took income
away from the film industry through either the use of foreign film material or
locally produced-and possibly pirated, videos which could service a great
many households ('Film industry protests against cable TV', The Hindu
(International Edition), Vol.17, No.9, 2 March 1991).
xi

'Court stays DD scheme on time slots', The Hindu (International Edition), 24
July 1993, p. 13.

xii

'Doordarshan's time slot schemes set aside', The Hindu (International
Edition), 2 October 1993, p.4.
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